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Kansas and Missouri v. Utilicorp United, Inc.: The Supreme
Court Applies the Illinois Brick Rule to Regulated Utilities
Although Congress has charged the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) with primary responsibility for enforcing the federal
antitrust laws,1 it also has authorized, in section four of the Clayton Act, a private right of action. Section four provides that:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
sustained,
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
2
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

Many authorities believe that private actions have yielded substantial benefits in the form of enhanced oversight and enforcement, and compensation for
persons wronged by anticompetitive behavior? Others, however, point to excessive costs, complexity, and a widespread belief that many treble damage suits are
brought merely to acquire a settlement based on nuisance value or to harm one's
competitors. 4 Regardless of the efficacy of private actions, they continue to constitute a substantial component of antitrust enforcement. Recent studies demonstrate that the vast majority of antitrust suits are brought by private parties,
rather than by the government.5
In adjudicating claims under section four of the Clayton Act, courts have
drawn a distinction between plaintiffs who are "direct purchasers," that is, parties who bought price-fixed goods or services directly from one of the conspirators, and "indirect purchasers," those who bought further down the distribution
chain. 6 The United States Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois7 declared that, except in certain narrow circumstances, indirect purchasers lack
standing to sue under section four.8 The Illinois Brick Court offered several
1. ABA ANTrrRUST SECTION, ANTrriUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 385 (2d ed. 1984).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
3. Loevinger, PrivateAction-The StrongestPillarofAntitrust, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 167, 16869 (1958). Loevinger points out that governmental enforcement focuses on punitive sanctions rather
than compensating victims. Id. Thus, private actions may result in outcomes more compatible with
the antitrust laws' primary goals, which are to deter future illegality, compensate victims, and ensure
that violators disgorge their ill-gotten gains. Blue Shield v. McReady, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).
4. See Turner, Private Antitrust Enforcement: Policy Recommendations, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 407, 407 (L. White ed. 1988).

5. See

ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
C-2 (1987) (published with REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1987)).

UNITED STATES COURTS 178, Table

6. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1661, 1663 (1989); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 724 (1977). To illustrate, assume that A conspires illegally with other producers
to raise prices of the product that A manufactures and sells. B then purchases some of these over-

priced products from A and in turn resells them to C. B would be a "direct purchaser" and C would
be an "indirect purchaser."
7. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
8. Id. at 736.
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policy reasons for creating this limitation: (1) a desire to avoid the complex
analysis necessary to establish the amount of an overcharge borne by various
parties in a distribution chain; (2) a fear that defendants might face multiple
liability; and (3) a concern that dividing the damage award among multiple
plaintiffs would so reduce any individual recovery that future claimants would
be discouraged from pursuing valid claims. 9
The Illinois Brick decision has generated considerable controversy and interest in the academic community.10 Most of the commentary has focused on
situations involving actors in competitive markets. However, when the direct
purchaser does not operate in a free market but is instead a regulated utility,
some of the policy concerns underlying the Illinois Brick rule change. The

United States Supreme Court, in the recent case of Kansas v. Utilicorp United,
Inc., 11 re-examined its standing rules in this new context. The Utilicorp Court
reaffimed its commitment to IllinoisBrick by extending the standing limitation

to situations involving a direct purchaser in a regulated industry. 12

This Note, after presenting the factual background of Utilicorp and a brief
summary of the seminal cases addressing direct purchaser standing, will discuss

some of the concerns raised by various commentators and evaluate their applicability to the regulatory context of Utilicorp. It then will examine two areas of

the standing issue clarified in Utilicorp. The Note concludes that the majority's
decision to adhere to the IllinoisBrick rule, despite a troubling lack of precedent

to support some of its assertions, best promotes the antitrust laws' goals of deterrence, compensation, and disgorgement of wrongfully obtained profits.
The claim in Utilicorp arose out of an alleged conspiracy to inflate natural
gas prices. 13 Defendants in the action included three companies and two limited
9. Id. at 737-47. For a detailed discussion of IllinoisBrick, see infra text accompanying notes
102-15.
10. See Bares, Fanelli, Gordon & Murphy, Scalingthe Illinois Brick Wall: The Future ofIndlrect Purchaserin Antitrust Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. Rnv. 309 (1978); Benston, Indirect Purchasers' Standing to Claim Damages in Price Fixing Antitrust Actions: A Benefit/Cost Analysis of
Proposalsto Changethe Illinois Brick Rule, 55 ANTrrRusT LJ. 213 (1986); Carrafiello, A Searchfor
Symmetry: The 'PassOn'Issue in Quest ofDetermination, 24 ANTrmusT BULL. 187 (1979); Cavanaugh, Illinois Brick Revisited: An Analysis of a Developing Antitrust Jurisprudence, 17 VAL. U.L.
REv. 63 (1983); Dunfee, Privity in Antitrust: Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 16 AM. Bus. L.J. 107 (1978);
Harris & Sullivan, Passingon the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U.
PA. L. REv. 269 (1980); Kamp, MonopsonisticPrice Fixing and Umbrella Pricingas a Theory of
Antitrust Standing: A New View of Illinois Brick, 50 U. CiN. L. REv. 52 (1981); Landes & Posner,
Should Indirect PurchasersHave Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis
of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CI. L. REv. 602 (1979) [hereinafter Should IndirectPurchasers
Have Standing]; Landes & Posner, The Economics ofPassing On: A Reply to Harrisand Sullivan,
128 U. PA. L. REv. 1274 (1980); Mantell, Denial ofa Forum to Indirect-PurchaserVictims ofPrice
Fixing Conspiracies: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Illinois Brick, 2 PACE L. REv. 153 (1982);
Watson, Bad Economics in the Antitrust Courtroom: Illinois Brick and the 'Pass-On' Problem, 9
ANTrrRusT L. & ECON. REV., no. 4, at 69 (1977).
11. I10 S. Ct. 2807 (1990).
12. Id.at2811. ,
13. In re Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust Cases, 695 F. Supp. 1109, 1111 (1988), aff'd, 866
F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990),
For the sake of clarity, this case is referred to in the text as Utilicorp even when discussing the case at
the district court and appeals court levels. When citing to the district court or appeals court opinions in footnotes, the title Wyoming Sands is used.
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partnerships that produced natural gas from the Wyoming Tight Sands Forma-

tion in Wyoming, and an interstate pipeline operator. 14 Among the plaintiffs
were three investor-owned public utilities that had purchased gas directly from
the pipeline, and the States of Kansas and Missouri, whose attorneys general

asserted claims in aparenspatriaecapacity on behalf of all residential customers
who had purchased gas from the utilities. 15 Plaintiffs brought the action pursuant to section four of the Clayton Act and sought treble damages for the

overcharge. 16

The defendants claimed that the public utilities, despite the fact that they
were direct purchasers, nonetheless lacked standing because they supposedly
had raised their own prices to offset the illegal overcharge and thus had suffered
no damage. 17 The utilities' customers, the defendants argued, had borne the
entire cost of the overcharge and were, therefore, the proper parties to the action. 18 The district court rejected this argument, relying on Illinois Brick and

Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 19 Although the direct purchasers in Utilicorp were regulated utilities, rather than members of a competi-

tive market, the standing limitation formulated in Hanover Shoe and Illinois

could purBrick was applicable nonetheless. 20 Because only direct purchasers
21
sue the claim, the parenspatriae claims had to be dismissed.

In reaching its decision, the district court also relied on a recent Seventh
Circuit case, Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. PanhandleEastern Pipe Line Co. 22 In
PanhandleEastern, the State of Illinois sought to represent customers of a regu-

lated gas distributor that had purchased natural gas at prices inflated because of
antitrust violations.2 3 The Seventh Circuit dismissed the claim, holding that

Illinois Brick barred claims by indirect purchasers unless they fell within one of
two narrow exceptions to this general rule.24 The court refused to adopt an
expansive interpretation of these exceptions: "Illinois Brick did not ... leave it
14. Wyoming Sands, 695 F. Supp. at 1111.
15. The attorneys general also were bringing claims on behalf of state agencies, municipalities,
and other political subdivisions that had purchased gas directly from the pipeline. Id. at 1112.
16. Id. For a chart showing all of the various plaintiffs and defendants in this complex litigation, see id. at 1119.
17. Id. at 1112.

18. Id.
19. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). In Hanover Shoe, the defendants similarly argued that the claims of

the direct purchaser plaintiff should be dismissed because it allegedly had passed on any overcharge
to its customers. The Hanover Shoe Court rejected this argument, holding that direct purchasers
were proper parties to an action even if they had passed on the entire overcharge. Id. at 489. For a
detailed discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 97-101.
20. The district court acknowledged that "Et]he fact that the alleged antitrust activity took
place in the context of a public utility direct purchaser renders inapplicable much of the rationale
behind the decisions in Illinois Brick and HanoverShoe." Wyoming Sands, 695 F. Supp. at 1114-15.
Nonetheless, the standing limitations espoused. in those cases had to be applied here, as the rule was
intended to be "as pervasive as possible." Id. at 1115.
21. Id. at 1118.
22. 839 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir.), withdrawn, aff'd in part, rev'd in part upon rehearing, 852 F.2d
891 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cerL denied, 109 S. Ct. 543 (1988).
23. Id. at 1207.
24. Id. at 1210. Dictum in Illinois Brick stated that indirect purchasers may be allowed standing in certain narrow instances. These exceptions are discussed infra in note 31, and in texts accompanying notes 113-15, 129-35.
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to the discretion of the lower courts to expand the exceptions to include situations [merely] within some range of approximation of the exceptions defined in
'25
Illinois Brick."

Soon thereafter, however, the Seventh Circuit withdrew its holding in Pan.
handle Eastern and granted a motion for rehearing. 26 Based on this development, the district court judge in Utilicorp granted a request by the attorneys
general of Kansas and Missouri for interlocutory appellate review of the standing issue. 27 The district judge certified the following question to the Tenth
Circuit:
In a private antitrust action under 15 U.S.C. § 15 involving claims of
price fixing against the producers of natural gas, is a State a proper
plaintiff as parenspatriae for its citizens who paid inflated prices for
natural gas, when the lawsuit already includes as plaintiffs those public
utilities who paid the inflated prices upon direct purchase from the
producers and who subsequently passed on most or all of the price
increase to the citizens of the State? 28
Before the Tenth Circuit heard this appeal, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en
banc, reversed in part its earlier decision in PanhandleEastern.29 Judge Posner,
writing for a five-judge plurality on a ten-judge panel, stated that the regulated
gas distributor, which was the direct purchaser, had passed on all of the overcharge, pursuant to a contract requiring it to do so. 3 0 Therefore, the indirect
purchasers had standing under the so-called "cost-plus contract exception." 3 1
The Tenth Circuit in Utilicorp refused to follow the Seventh Circuit's holding.3 2 The court first noted that in PanhandleEastern only one regulated com33
pany sought relief, while in the case subjudice three utilities claimed damages.
25. PanhandleE, 839 F.2d at 1210.
26. See Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891, 892 (7th
Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 543 (1988).
27. Wyoming Sands, 695 F. Supp. at 1120.
28. Id.
29. See PanhandleR, 852 F.2d at 899. For a discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 118-28.
30. 852 F.2d at 894. "Pass-through" clauses are now very common in public utility regulatory
schemes. See Hammond, An Overview ofElectric Utility Regulation, in ELECTRIC POWER: DEREGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 46 (J. Moorhouse ed. 1986). They also are referred to as

"flow-through" provisions, "price adjustment mechanisms," and other variations as well,
31. See PanhandleE, 852 F.2d at 898-99. The "cost-plus exception" to the direct purchaser
rule devolves from dicta in HanoverShoe and IllinoisBrick stating that indirect purchasers "might"
have standing to assert an antitrust claim in situations in which the direct purchaser has passed on
the entire overcharge to the indirect purchaser pursuant to a pre-existing cost-plus contract. See
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). In such instances, the direct purchaser would not suffer any cognizable injury because: (1) any overcharge resulting from the illegal behavior would pass through to
the buyer as required by the contract; and (2) the direct purchaser would not suffer any loss of sales
because the buyer(s) would be obligated to purchase the amount agreed to in the contract. See
generally Comment, A Legal andEconomic Analysis ofthe Cost-Plus ContractException in Hanover
Shoe and Illinois Brick, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 743, 752-53 (1980) (applying techniques of economic
analysis to explain the absence of injury to the direct purchaser and to evaluate the cost-plus
exception).
32. See In re Wyoming Sands Antitrust Cases, 866 F.2d 1286, 1293 (10th Cir. 1989), aff'd sub
nom. Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S.Ct. 2807 (1990).
33. Id. at 1292.
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Not all of these operated under fuel-price adjustment clauses as did the utility in
PanhandleEastern.34 Thus, the issue of whether the utilities had passed on all
of the overcharge was an unresolved question of fact. 35 The Tenth Circuit
stated further that even a complete pass-through would not bring the facts
within the cost-plus exception,3 6 as Judge Posner had asserted in Panhandle
Eastern.3 7 The cost-plus doctrine, claimed the Tenth Circuit, applied only when
the indirect purchasers were contractually bound to purchase a fixed quantity of
the item fixed by contract; no such agreement was present between the utilities
and residential consumers. 38 Because the exception was inapplicable, the general rule prohibiting indirect purchaser standing controlled. The Tenth Circuit
thus disregarded the Seventh Circuit's holding in PanhandleEastern and upheld
39
the district court's dismissal of the parenspatriae claims.
To resolve this conflict between the two circuits, 4° the United States
Supreme Court granted the states' petition for certiorari. 4 In a five to four decision, the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's holding.42 Writing for the majority, 43 Justice Kennedy began by rejecting the petitioners' argument that indirect
purchaser standing should be allowed in cases involving a regulated utility that
has passed on one hundred percent of the overcharge to its customers. 44 Even if
a utility raises its rates to offset fully the cost increase, it still may have suffered
an injury by the overcharge:
"The mere fact that a price rise followed an unlawful cost increase

does not show that the sufferer of the cost increase was undamaged.
His customers may have been ripe for his price rise earlier; if a cost rise
is merely the occasion for a price increase a businessman could have
imposed absent the rise in his costs, the fact that he was earlier not
enjoying the benefits of the higher price should not permit the [wrongdoer].., to take those benefits from him ....This statement merely
recognizes the usual principle that the possessor of a right can recover
for its unlawful deprivation whether or not he was previously exercis'45
ing it."
Because of this concern, an indirect purchaser, to prove that the utilities had not
incurred any damage from the overcharge, would have to demonstrate that the
46
utilities could not have raised prices had there been no increase in fuel cost.
34. Id. at 1292-93 & n.2.
35. Id. at 1293.
36. See id.
37. See Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E.Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891, 893 (7th Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986 (1988).
38. Wyoming Sands, 866 F.2d at 1292.
39. Id. at 1294.
40. The Supreme Court explicitly stated that its reason for hearing the Utilicorp case was "to
resolve a conflict between this decision and ...PanhandleEastern." Utilicorp, 110 S.Ct. at 2811
(citation omitted).
41. Kansas v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 110 S.Ct. 833 (1990).
42. See Utilicorp, 110 S.Ct. at 2810.
43. Joining the majority were Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
44. Utilicorp, 110 S.Ct. at 2812-13.
45. Id. (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 n.9 (1968)).
46. Id.
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Such a demonstration would require evidence that prevailing market conditions
would not have permitted a price hike or evidence that state regulators would
have rejected a rate increase. 47 Allowing indirect purchasers to attempt such a
showing would necessitate delving into the intricacies of economic analysis or
state regulatory law, all to ascertain a fact wholly unrelated to the defendants'
liability. 48 Even if an indirect purchaser succeeded in proving this fact, the utilities still would have incurred nominal losses in the form of decreased earnings
during the so-called "lag period," 49 and the apportionment problem would remain.50 The Court stated that these complexities need not be incurred to secure
compensation for residential consumers; if the utilities prevailed in the litigation,
state regulators likely would require them to pass on a portion of the amount
recovered to their customers. 5 1
Justice Kennedy then focused on the potential problems that would ensue if
parens patriae actions were permitted on behalf of indirect purchasers.52 The
53
states, noted the Court, had authority to represent only residential customers.
Industrial and nonresident users would have to fend for themselves. Many of
these unrepresented parties would intervene in the action, making the suit unmanageable and raising the possibility of error.5 4 The Court concluded that
"'even if ways could be found to bring all potential plaintiffs together in one
huge action, the complexity thereby introduced into treble-damages proceedings
argues strongly for retaining the Hanover Shoe rule.' ,,55
The Court next rejected the petitioners' assertion that the utilities, having
56
passed on the cost of the overcharge, would lack incentive to pursue the claim.
The majority noted that state utility commissions have broad discretionary powers under most state regulatory schemes and might forbid a utility from passing

on the costs of the overcharge if it failed to pursue a valid claim.5 7 Moreover, if
the utility sued and won, it would net a sizeable recovery, even after refunding
the overcharge amount to its customers.5 8 Justice Kennedy concluded by citing
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2814. The "lag period" refers to the time from when the antitrust violator raises the
price of the gas sold to the utility to the time when the utility is able to offset this increase by raising
its prices. During this period the utility will be paying higher prices for fuel while charging the
same pre-overcharge price to customers for its service. Thus, the utility's profits per unit will drop
until it clears the necessary bureaucratic hurdles. See generally, M. SCHMIDT, AUTOMATIC ADJuSTMENT CLAUSES: THEORY AND APPLICATION 7-8 (1980) (discussing the lag period concept).
50. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2814.
51. Id. at 2814-15.
52. See id. at 2815.
53. Id. The enabling statute reads, in relevant part: "Any attorney general of a State may

bring a civil action in the name of such State, as parenspatriae on behalf of naturalpersons residing
in such State." 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
54. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 1215.
55. Id. (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 731 n.ll (1977)).
56. See id. at 2816.
57. Id.
58. Id.

1991]

ANTITRUST & REGULATED INDUSTRIES

1047

past instances of diligent claim enforcement by utilities.5 9
The Court then addressed the issue of deterrence. Allowing indirect purchaser standing, stated the majority, may hamper private antitrust enforcement
because most retail customers lack the expertise and experience necessary to
detect a price-fixing conspiracy. 6° Even if they did discover illegal behavior, the
small individual amounts at stake probably would be insufficient to entice retail
customers into enduring the inconveniences of prolonged litigation. 6 1 Moreover, parenspatriae actions would not solve these difficulties because the enabling statute affords only limited representation 62 and because states' attorneys
63
general may be hesitant to pursue smaller, more speculative claims.
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the rationales isnderlying Hanover
Shoe and Illinois Brick would not be equally compelling in all cases. 64 Nevertheless, adhering to the rules announced in those cases, even in circumstances in
which the policy justifications were weaker, was preferable to having courts attempt to "'carve out exceptions to the [direct purchaser] rule for particular
types of markets.' "65 Allowing the latter would "'inject the same "massive
evidence and complicated theories" into treble-damages proceedings"' as courts
66
tried to determine which industry groups qualified and which did not.
The states' attorneys general also had argued that the utilities' one hundred
percent pass-through provisions brought them within the cost-plus exception 67
mentioned in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick.68 The Court concluded, however, that the facts in Utilicorp were not within that exception:
The respondent did not sell the gas to its customers under a preexisting cost-plus contract. Even if we were to create an exception for
situations that merely resemble those governed by such a contract, we
would not apply the exception here. ... The utility customers made

no commitment to purchase any particular quantity 69
of gas, and the
utility itself had no guarantee of any particular profit.
The petitioners' final argument was that section 4C of the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 197670 gave states the right to sue on
59. Id. (citing Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203, 208 (7th
Cir. 1964); Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914,949-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)).
60. Id. at 2816.

61. Id. at 2817.
62. Id. at 2816-17. The federal parens patriae statute is 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1988). For a

discussion of this statute, see infra text accompanying notes 136-43.
63. Utilicorp, 110 S.Ct. at 2816.
64. Id. at 2817. For a discussion of the policy rationales underlying the standing limitation, see
supra text accompanying note 9, and infra text accompanying notes 102-10.
65. Utilicorp, 110 S.Ct. at 2817 (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 744
(1977)).
66. Id. (quoting IllinoisBrick, 431 U.S. at 745).
67. See supra note 31.
68. Utilicorp, 110 S.Ct. at 2817. This same assertion formed the basis for the Seventh Circuit's
en banc holding in PanhandleEastern. See supra text accompanying notes 30-3 1; infra text accompanying notes 118-28.
69. Utilicorp, 110 S.Ct. at 2817-18.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1988); see infra text accompanying note 137.
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behalf of consumers even in situations in which the consumers themselves, as
indirect purchasers, would not have standing to sue. 71 The Court rejected this

assertion, stating that section 4C merely "'created a new procedural device.,.
to enforce existing rights of recovery under § 4 [of the Clayton Act].'" 72 The
statute did not create standing for states' attorneys general to bring parens patriae actions on behalf of persons who themselves lacked standing to assert anti73
trust claims.
Justice White, joined by three members of the Court, dissented. 74 White
claimed that the majority's adherence to direct purchaser standing contravened
the "plain language" of section four, which Congress had enacted to ensure that
"victims of anticompetitive conduct receive compensation." 75 Although acknowledging that Illinois Brick had denied standing to indirect purchasers,
White distinguished the facts in that case from the Utilicorp situation, noting
that the participants in Illinois Brick operated in competitive markets but the
76
direct purchasers in Utilicorp were regulated monopolies.
Justice White also criticized the majority for engaging in "what amounts to
a fact-finding mission" as to whether the utilities passed on the entire overcharge.77 Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit had assumed a complete
78
pass-through; therefore, White argued, tlfe Court should have done the same.
The dissent considered the majority's concern over apportionment unfounded in this context. 79 The apportionment problem in Illinois Brick arose
from the complexity involved in determining the portion of the overcharge
borne by the direct and indirect purchasers.80 But in Utilicorp, the utilities were
permitted to pass on all of the overcharge to their customers, thus obviating any
need for apportionment.8 1 Justice White stated that it would be "fanciful, at
least unrealistic, to think that a utility entitled to pass on to its customers the
cost of gas that it has purchased will not do so to the maximum extent permitted
'8 2
by law."
The dissent next took issue with the majority's claim that restricting standing to the utilities would enhance enforcement. 8 3 Indirect purchasers, contrary
to the Court's assertion, would discover easily the antitrust violation as the price
71. See Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2818.
72. Id. (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 734 n.14 (1977)).
73. Id.

See infra text accompanying notes 117-24.

74. 110 S. Ct. at 2818 (White, J., dissenting). Joining the dissent were Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. It is interesting to find Justice White leading the dissent here; he wrote the
majority opinions in both HanoverShoe and Illinois Brick.
75. Id. at 2818-19 (White, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2819 (White, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 2820 (White, J., dissenting).
80. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (White, J., dissenting) Justice White also dismissed the majority's concerns over lag
period losses as unlikely and "speculative." Id. at 2821 n.* (White, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2820 (White, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 2821 (White, J., dissenting).
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increases would appear in their utility bills.8 4 Conversely, argued Justice White,
the majority overstated the utilities' incentives to sue.8 5 He claimed that treble
damages would be calculated only on the basis of the utilities' lost sales, not on
the amount of the overcharge, since they had passed on that cost to their customers.8 6 Moreover, the Court engaged in mere speculation by asserting that a
state regulatory commission would allow the utility to keep a portion of any
recovery.8 7 No precedent existed for such an assertion. 8
Lastly, the dissent claimed that the majority's concern over possible multiple liability was unfounded.8 9 As no apportionment problem existed here, there
was no chance that the defendant would end up paying overlapping damages to
direct and indirect purchasers. 90
One can trace the roots of the direct purchaser rule back to the early part of
this century. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-TaenzerLumber Co.9 1 the plaintiff, a shipper of goods, brought suit against a railroad, claiming that it had
charged unreasonably high rates.92 The defendant alleged that, because the
plaintiffs were able to pass on the overcharge, they could not claim damages and
thus had no cause of action. 93 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, rejected
this argument, stating:
The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to
go beyond the first step. As it does not attribute remote consequences
to a defendant so it holds him liable if proximately the plaintiff has
suffered a loss. The plaintiffs suffered losses to the amount of the verdict when they paid. Their claim accrued at once in the theory of the

law and it does not inquire into later events.... The carrier ought not
to be allowed to retain his illegal profit, and the only one who can take
it from him is the one that alone was in relation with him, and from
whom the carrier took the sum.... Probably in the94end the public
pays the damages in most cases of compensated torts.
It was in two more recent cases, HanoverShoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.95 and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.,96 however, that the Court clearly
enunciated its stance regarding the standing of direct and indirect purchasers.
In Hanover Shoe, the plaintiff shoe company brought suit under section four of
84. Id. at 2820-21 (White, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 2821 (White, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White cites no authority for this claim. Indeed, it seems
odd that a direct purchaser would be able to recover three-fold only for lost profits. Since, under
IllinoisBrick, indirect purchasers cannot sue for the overcharge, this would mean that nobody can
recover this amount from the wrongdoer. This result seems antithetical to the antitrust laws' deterrence goal.
87. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2821 (White, J., dissenting).
90. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
91. 245 U.S. 531 (1918).

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 533.
Id.
Id. at 533-34 (citations omitted).
392 U.S. 481 (1968).
431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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the Clayton Act against United, a manufacturer of shoe machinery, claiming
that United was monopolizing the shoe machinery industry by refusing to sell its
equipment, requiring users to lease it instead. 9 7 United contended that Hanover
had suffered no cognizable injury because it had passed on the illegal overcharge
to its customers. 98 The Court rejected this pass-on defense, stating that entertaining such a claim would raise difficult issues of proving the amount of the
overcharge passed on and determining whether, absent any overcharge, the
plaintiff could have raised its prices. 99 The Court also expressed concern that
the ultimate buyers would have only a minuscule personal stake in a lawsuit and
thus would be unwilling to endure the inconveniences of litigation. 1°° This
would diminish private enforcement and increase the likelihood that those guilty
of breaking the antitrust laws would escape liability.101
Nine years later, the Court in Illinois Brick was faced with a different application of the pass-on theory. Illinois Brick involved a suit brought by the
State of Illinois and 700 local governmental entities against a group of concrete
block manufacturers, alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of section
one of the Sherman Act.102 Masonry contractors had purchased the allegedly
overpriced blocks from the conspirators and had resold them to general contractors. The general contractors then used these blocks in state projects.10 3 Illinois
claimed that part or all of the overcharge had been passed through the chain of
distribution and, as a result, the state had paid three million dollars in excess
charges for the overpriced blocks."14 The Court dismissed the claim, holding
that indirect purchasers may not sue for antitrust damages.10 Because Hanover
Shoe disallowed defensive use of a pass-on theory by a defendant, 10 6 the Court in
Illinois Brick felt obligated to prohibit offensive use of the pass-on doctrine by
plaintiffs.10 7 To permit the latter while disallowing the former would create a
risk of multiple liability: "A one-sided application of HanoverShoe substantially
increases the possibility of inconsistent adjudications-and therefore of unwarranted multiple liability for the defendant-by presuming that one plaintiff (the
direct purchaser) is entitled to full recovery while preventing the defendant from
97. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 483, 488-89.
98. Id. at 487-88.
99. Id. at 489-94.
100. Id. at 494.

101. Id.
102. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726-27. Section 1 of the Sherman act provides, in relevant part:

"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1988).
103. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726.
104. Id. at 727.
105. Id. at 736.
106. "Defensive use" of the pass-on theory refers to a situation such as the one presented in
Hanover Shoe: a defendant claims that the plaintiff, who is a direct purchaser, should have her claim
dismissed because she has passed on all of the overcharge to her customers. "Offensive use" refers to
situations like that in Illinois Brick: a plaintiff who is an indirect purchaser tries to establish standing by claiming that part or all of an illegal overcharge has been passed on to him.

107. 431 U.S. at 730. The Court also discussed the option of abandoning the HanoverShoe rule
as an alternative to denying standing to indirect purchaser plaintiffs. Id. at 729. The Court refused
to take this option, however. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 112.
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using that presumption against the other plaintiff ....

10 8o

The Illinois Brick Court also reiterated the concern expressed in Hanover
Shoe that uncertainties and difficulties inherent in analyzing price and output
decisions made by companies would cause confusion and lead to judicial inefficiency.10 9 Allowing multiple parties from remote links in the distribution chain
to join a suit would transform section four actions into massive multi-party proceedings, requiring the courts to trace the effects of the overcharge through each
step of the distribution chain. 110
The Court noted that Congress, if it disagreed with the Court's use of the
pass-on rule, was free to legislate an alternative interpretation."' Absent congressional action, however, the Illinois Brick Court was unwilling to overrule
HanoverShoe, noting that eight justices had voted with the majority in that case,
and that concerns of stare decisis weighed heavily in the area of statutory construction. The Court stated, "This presumption of adherence to our prior decisions construing legislative enactments would support our reaffirmance of the
HanoverShoe construction of § 4 ... even if the Court were persuaded that the
use of pass-on theories by plaintiffs and defendants... is more consistent with
the policies underlying the treble-damages actions than is the Hanover Shoe
rule."

112

The Court mentioned two possible exceptions to the direct purchaser limitation. The first, initially announced in Hanover Shoe, would confer standing on

an indirect purchaser when the direct purchaser has passed on the entire overcharge with a pre-existing cost-plus contract for a fixed quantity. 113 The rationale underlying this exception is that the fixed-volume term in the contract
furnishes ready proof that the direct purchaser suffered no damage. 1 4 The second situation in which indirect purchaser standing may be permitted arises when
the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer. 115 In these instances, the indirect purchaser is, in a sense, also the direct purchaser.
Following the Illinois Brick decision, lower courts struggled to define the
scope of the cost-plus exception. While some felt it applied only -to actual costplus contracts with fixed-quantity requirements, 116 a few courts were willing to
117
expand its application to situations that were mere "functional equivalents."
108. 431 U.S. at 730.
109. Id. at 732-33.
110. Id. at 737.
111. Id. at 736. In fact, there have been numerous congressional attempts, all unsuccessful, to'
change the standing rules adopted by the Court. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
112. IllinoisBrick, 431 U.S. at 736-37.
113. See id. at 735-36; HanoverShoe, 392 U.S. at 494. For an explanation of the cost-plus exception, see supra note 31.
114. llinios Brick, 431 U.S. at 736.
115. See id, at 736 n.16.
116. See, e.g., Zinser v. Continental Grain Co., 660 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1981), cert denied,
455 U.S. 941 (1982); Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616, 633 n.4 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); Midwest Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d
573, 577 n.9, 580 (3d Cir. 1979); Abbotts Dairies Div. of Fairmont Foods, Inc. v. Butz, 584 F.2d 12,
17 n. 11,18 (3d Cir. 1978); Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 487 F. Supp. 808, 819 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
117. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891, 898 (7th
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In Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. PanhandleEastern Pipe Line Co.,' 18 the State of
Illinois brought suit on behalf of all customers of Central Illinois Light Company (CILCO) against Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company, alleging that it
had inflated illegally the price of gas sold to CILCO. 119 A provision in CILCO's
contract mandated a one hundred percent pass-through of all cost increases to
its residential customers.1 20 The Seventh Circuit originally dismissed the claim,
holding it barred under Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick.' 2 1 The court subsequently withdrew the opinion and granted rehearing. Sitting en banc, the Seventh Circuit partially reversed its earlier ruling and held that the State did have
standing as an indirect purchaser under the cost-plus exception.1 22 Judge Posner, writing for a plurality, stated that the facts in PanhandleEastern were far
removed from those in Illinois Brick, claiming that "[tihe Supreme Court has
never adverted to the issue involved in the present case."' 123 He further asserted
that no apportionment problem existed in PanhandleEastern because the direct
purchaser (CILCO) and the indirect purchasers (CILCO's residential customers
represented by the State) suffered different types of damage. 124 Specifically,
CILCO incurred lost profits from the reduced sales volume caused by the price
rise while residents bore the entirety of the overcharge. 125 Because there was no
overlap in damages claimed, each party could pursue its own discrete recovery.
The combination of cost-plus pricing 126 and ease of apportionment led Judge
Posner to hold that the residential consumers fell within the cost-plus exception. 12 7 Although admitting that there was no actual fixed-quantity requirement
present, Posner claimed that such a literal application of IllinoisBrick would be
inappropriate here given the difference in fact situations. 128 Ease of differentiating CILCO's lost sales damages from the residential consumers' overcharge
129
damages provided a valid surrogate to a fixed-quantity contract.
The United States Supreme Court in Utilicorp rejected the Seventh Circuit's
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 543 (1988); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148,
1163-64 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980). The phrase "functional equivalent" refers
to a situation in which the direct and indirect purchasers are not parties to an actual pre.existing
cost-plus contract, but are in circumstances that make it easy for the indirect purchaser to demonstrate that the direct purchaser passed on the entire amount of any overcharge and suffered no
diminution in sales volume as a result of the wrongful activity. See Comment, supra note 31, at 75664 (discussing the differing lower court approaches to functional equivalence).

118. 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 543 (1988).
119. Id. at 892.
120. Id. at 894.
121. Illinois ex rel Hartigan v. Panhandle E., 839 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part

upon rehearing, 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 543 (1988). For a discussion of the original holding in this case (before its withdrawal), see supra text accompanying notes
23-25.
122. Panhandle E., 852 F.2d 891, 899 (7th Cir. 1988). See supra note 31 for a discussion of the

cost-plus exception.
123. 852 F.2d at 893.
124. Id. at 896.
125. Id. at 897.
126. Utilities set rates by adding together all allowed costs and a preset return on capital. Hammond, supra note 30, at 45-46.
127. PanhandleE., 852 F.2d at 895.
128. Id. at 893.
129. Id. at 895.
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use of the cost-plus exception 130 and clarified somewhat the conditions necessary to assert this doctrine. The Court held that a situation in which a direct
purchaser's only damage arises from lost sales volume, as was the case in Panhandle Eastern, does not qualify as a valid cost-plus exception. 131 Rather, the
Court stated that to qualify, the indirect purchasers must demonstrate that the
direct purchaser has not suffered injury of any kind whatsoever: "we might allow indirect purchasers to sue only when, by hypothesis, the direct purchaser
will bear no portion of the overcharge and otherwise suffer no injury."1 32 Moreover, the indirect purchaser must be able to demonstrate this absence of injury
without resort to complex economic or market analysis.' 33 It is difficult to envi-

sion a situation other than an actual fixed-quantity cost-plus contract that would
meet these strict requirements. Nonetheless, the Court did leave open the possibility of allowing the exception in circumstances "that merely resemble those
governed by such a contract." 134 The Utilicorp Court also refused to state definitively that it would recognize a cost-plus exception, choosing instead to repeat
the equivocal language used in previous opinions--that indirect purchasers
"might" have standing in these circumstances.' 35 Thus, while the Utilicorp
holding clarifies somewhat the parameters for the cost-plus contract exception, it
fails to clarify whether or not it exists in the first place.
The Utilicorp Court also delineated its interpretation of section 4C of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.136 This statute reads,
in relevant part:
Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the name of
such State, as parenspatriae on behalf of natural persons residing in
such State, in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the defendant, to secure monetary relief as provided in this section
for injury sustained by such natural persons
to their property by reason
37
of any violation of [the Sherman Act].'
The Court held that states could not represent anyone in aparenspatriaecapacity unless that person would have had standing to sue in an individual capacity.138 This interpretation of section 4C seems contrary to the aims of its
congressional proponents, who intended that the statute enable states' attorneys
139
general to sue on behalf of consumers, be they direct or indirect purchasers.
130. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2811.
131. Id. at 2817.
132. Id. at 2818 (emphasis added).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2817.
135. Id.; see also IllinoisBrick, 431 U.S. at 735-36 ('IThis Court in Hanover Shoe indicated the
narrow scope it intended for any exception to its rule barring pass-on defenses by citing, as the only
example of a situation where the defense might be permitted, a pre-existing cost-plus contract.");
Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494 ("IT]here might be situations-for instance, when an overcharged
buyer has a pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract, thus making it easy to prove that he has not been
damaged-where the considerations requiring that the passing-on defense not be permitted...
would not be present.").
136. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2818.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1988).
138. See Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2818.

139. See, eg., 122 CONG. Rac. 30878 (1976) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
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Soon after passage of this legislation, however, the Supreme Court held in Illinois Brick that indirect purchasers had no standing to sue. 140 This caused much

consternation among supporters of a broader interpretation of section 4C including Justice Brennan, who claimed, in his dissenting opinion to IllinoisBrick, that
"[t]oday's decision flouts Congress' purpose and severely undermines the effectiveness of the private treble-damages action as an instrument of antitrust enforcement." 14 1 Members of Congress have held numerous hearings on proposed
legislation to overturn or limit the rule.14 2 Thus far, however, none of these
proposals has been enacted into law.
In spite of IllinoisBrick, some thought that states might still be given standing to sue under section 4C on behalf of consumers who were indirect purchasers, even though such persons could not sue in an individual capacity. 143 The
Utilicorp Court ended this speculation, holding that section 4C merely created a
new procedural device to enforce existing rights; it did not create standing where
none had previously existed. 144
The Utilicorp case is also significant for its application of the direct purchaser standing limitation, for the first time, to a regulated industry. 14 5 This
holding should quell any notions that the rules set forth in Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick were limited to selected industries or markets; 146 the majority was
adamant in its belief that attempting to exempt certain industries would be "an
unwarranted and counterproductive exercise." 147
[Rlecoveries are authorized by the compromise bill whether or not the consumers
purchased directly from the price fixer, or indirectly, from intermediaries, retailers, or
other middlemen. The technical and procedural argument that consumers have no "standing" whenever they are not "in privity" with the price fixer, and have not purchased directly from him, is rejected by the compromise bill.

Id
140. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735-36.
141. Id. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. See The Antitrust Remedies Improvement Act and the Intellectual PropertyReform Act of
1987: Hearings on S. 1407 and S. 635 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong,. 1st & 2d Sess. 1-298 (1987-88); The Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1986 (IllinoisBrick): Hearing of the Comm. on the Judiciaryon S. 2481, 99th
Cong,. 2d Sess. 1-119 (1986); Antitrust FairnessAmendments of 1983 and Oversight of Corporate
Interlocks: Hearing on HR. 2244 and OversightBefore the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong,. 2d Sess. 1-152 (1984); The Taxpayer
Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1983 (IllinoisBrick): Hearings on S. 915 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-237 (1983); Restoring Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust
Laws: Hearings on H.R. 2060 and2204 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and CommercialLaw of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., IstSess. 1-333 (1979); Fairand Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearings on S. 1874 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust andMonopoly of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 2d Sss. 1-203 (1978); Effective Enforcement of the
Antitrust Laws: Hearingson H.R. 8359Before the Subcomm. on Monopoliesand CommercialLaw of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sss. 4-231 (1977).
143. See Brief for the Petitioners at 23-27, Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct, 2807
(1990) (No. 88-2109); Note, Parens Patriae Actions on Behalf of IndirectPurchasers: Do They Survive Illinois Brick?, 34 HASINGs L.J. 179, 191 (1982).
144. See Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2818.
145. Id. at 2812.
146. This was one of the petitioners' arguments in Utilicorp. See Brief for the Petitioners at 10,
Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990) (No. 88-2109).
147. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2817.
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Although the wide applicability of the direct purchaser limitation can no
longer be in doubt, much controversy over the wisdom of the rule remains. 148
To evaluate the Court's holding in Utilicorp, one should analyze its likely effect
on the underlying goals of private antitrust enforcement: deterring future violations, compensating victims, and forcing disgorgement of illegal profits.' 49 Focusing first on compensation, an ideal resolution in the present context would be
one that fully reimburses consumers for that portion of the overcharge borne by
them and the utilities for any lost sales caused by having to raise their prices in
reaction to a supplier's illegal behavior (as well as any portion of the overcharge
not passed on to consumers). The Utilicorp Court's holding, at first glance,
seems to reward unduly the utilities by allowing them to recover the entire treble
amount, including the portion allocable to the overcharge, while denying the
consumers any recovery whatsoever. The Court justifies this outcome by predicting that a state regulatory commission most likely would force the utility to
remit at least part of any damage award to its customers, presumably in the form
of lower rates. 150 In support of this proposition, the Court cites a lone case
decided by the Louisiana Public Service Commission, In re Petition of LP & L
for OrderRelating to Disposition of ProceedsAgainst Gas Supplier.151 The damages in LP & L 1 52 resulted from a breach of contract action rather than an
antitrust claim.1 53 Nevertheless, the Commission mandated that the utility flow
the proceeds back to its customers by reducing its rates over a five-year period.1 54 Outside of this example, however, there is scant precedent, either for or
against, the Court's assertion that utilities would have to disgorge part of any
treble award.
Whether the Utiicorpholding furthers or hinders the compensatory aims of
section four of the Clayton Act essentially turns on how a state regulatory commission decides to allocate the damage award. If it orders a refund to consumers
equal to the amount of the overcharge borne by them, then an almost ideal
solution is achieved: nearly all injured parties would receive compensation. 155
Conversely, if the regulators permitted a utility to keep the entire award, or
instead required it to remit the entire amount to its customers, then some parties
remain uncompensated while others received an award greatly in excess of any
damage suffered. Because the first alternative yields a plainly superior result,
and because regulators tend to seek outcomes that balance conflicting claims and
148. See supra note 10 (citing commentary).
149. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).
150. See Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2815.
151. In re: Petition of LP & L for Order Relating to Disposition of Proceeds Against Gas Supplier, Nos. U-17906, U-12636, U-17649 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 1, 1989) (LEXIS, UTILTY
library, LaPUC file).
152. "LP & L" is an abbreviation for "Louisiana Power and Light Company."
153. LP & L, at 26.
154. Id. at 31-32.
155. The compensation scheme would be imperfect, even in this scenario. Some customers who
paid the overcharge will have moved out of the area before the rate reduction goes into effect, thus
forfeiting their portion of compensation. Also, persons who move into the utility's service area after
the violation is discovered and enjoined will reap the benefits of lower utility prices without having
paid the previous overcharge.
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minimize harm to any one group, 156 they most likely would choose it over the
latter, more one-sided alternatives.
If, rather than limiting standing to direct purchasers, the Utihicorp Court
had allowed the states to sue on behalf of the indirect purchasers, then a court,
rather than a regulatory commission, would have borne the responsibility for
allocating the recovery among the various plaintiffs. This introduces the difficulties discussed by the Utilicorp Court, such as apportionment and multiplicity of
parties. The petitioners in Utilicorp argued that no apportionment difficulties
would arise; states would collect for the overcharge while the utilities would
recover for lost profits from lower sales. 157 The problem with this scenario is
that one cannot assume a total pass-through. Not all utilities operate under
automatic price-adjustment agreements. Utilicorp's Kansas Public Service operation, for example, was not subject to a flow-through mechanism until 1987.158
Companies without these provisions would have to petition the regulatory
agency for a rate hike to offset the cost increase caused by the antitrust violation.
This typically is a cumbersome process. As Professor Navarro notes:
The rate-making process is far from instantaneous. For a utility to
raise its rates, it must first make a formal request, which is handled
through courtlike proceedings. The time between the filing for a rate
hike and actually having it granted is the lag time.... When regulatory lag is long-as it is in many states-the utility loses out on the
potential earnings during the rate-setting process. 159
On top of the lag period costs, there is no guarantee that the commission would
allow a rate hike. Regulators have broad discretion in these matters and, depending on the political climate and the ideological makeup of the commission,
may decide to deny the request. 6°
Even utilities that are subject to price-adjustment mechanisms may have to
bear part of the overcharge damage; some regulatory schemes now use "partial
pass-through" clauses, which require utilities to absorb a percentage of any fuelcost increase.1 61 The rationale behind these provisions is that forcing the utility
to bear part of a cost increase will encourage it to operate prudently and efficiently. 162 Several states have adopted this incentive-based methodology while
others have rejected it. 163 The implications of this development for utility cus156. Hammond, supra note 30, at 40.
157. Distributing the award to consumers may be more difficult in this situation. A regulatory
commission would seem to be better situated to distribute the award to consumers than a court
because the regulators can make use of the utilities' existing customer billing systems to channel
funds to the rightful beneficiaries.
158. Respondents' Brief in Opposition at 6 n.5, Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807

(1990) (No. 88-2109).
159. Navarro, The Performance of Utility Commissions, in ELECTRIC POWER: DEREGULATION
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 337, 339 (J. Moorhouse ed. 1986).

160. Id.
161. See, eg., In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., (NY PSC 1983) 56 PUR 4th 315; see also
PartialPassthrough(Incentive) Fuel Clauses, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 8, 1985, at 52 (detailing the
increasing use of partial pass-through provisions) [hereinafter PartialPassthrough].
162. PartialPassthrough,supra note 161, at 52.
163. Id.
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tomers seeking standing as indirect purchasers are serious: contrary to the assertions of the petitioners in Utilicorp, one cannot safely assume that a given
utility will be able to pass on one hundred percent of an illegal overcharge. Instead, an investigation into state regulatory law may be required to determine if
the utility is subject to an automatic adjustment provision and, if so, the amount
of pass-on permitted. The court also would have to evaluate detailed cost data
and financial computations to ascertain losses during periods of regulatory lag.
It seems unnecessary to burden courts with these issues in an effort to compensate consumers; as stated before, a utility commission most likely would order a
refund to customers for the amount of the overcharge borne by them. True, the
commissioners would have to delve into regulatory law and perform the same
financial calculations that a court otherwise would be faced with, but commissions are much more knowledgeable in this arcane area than most judges and
could dispose of the task with greater efficiency and expertise. In sum, allowing
indirect purchasers standing to sue in a Utilicorp-typesetting would not improve
their chances of ultimately receiving compensation for bearing their portion of
an illegal overcharge.

A second major objective of allowing private actions under section four is
deterrence of future violations. From this standpoint, an ideal outcome would
provide a potential financial reward sufficient to encourage parties to endure the
difficulties and inconveniences of protracted litigation, and discourage would-be
offenders from breaking the law in the first place. The Illinois Brick standing
limitation essentially places all the deterrence eggs in one basket: if the direct
purchaser(s) should fail to bring suit, then the transgression will go unpunished.
Therefore, the rule is sensible only if direct purchasers have adequate incentives
to pursue claims. When the direct purchaser is a regulated utility, the incentive
may not be as strong as if it were in a competitive industry; the utility in most
instances will have passed on much of the overcharge; it may be reluctant to
upset long-standing personal relationships that have developed between it and its
supplier; and, if it recovers damages, it probably would have to share the award
with its customers. To support its assertion that adequate incentives do exist in
a regulatory context, the Utilicorp Court again found itself speculating as to how
state regulators would act. The majority claimed that a commission probably
would disallow a utility's request for a rate increase if it avoided bringing suit
and that the threat of this occurrence would encourage the utility to pursue
claims. 164 A commission, however, may not be aware of the illegal activity and,
in any case, may be somewhat reluctant to penalize a utility for mere inaction.
Moreover, if the utility is subject to an automatic price adjustment mechanism,
it could offset the overcharge through higher rates without seeking the regulators' approval, although the commission presumably could get its pound of flesh
from the misbehaving utility at the next formal rate hearing. Overall, the threat
of regulatory retribution may or may not provide a compelling incentive for a
utility to pursue antitrust claims.
Besides the "stick" of a possible regulatory refusal of an offsetting rate in164. See Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2816.
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crease, a significant "carrot" awaits a utility should litigation be pursued to a
successful conclusion. Apart from three-fold damages for lost profits caused by
lower sales, the utility might get to keep a sizable chunk of the portion of the
treble award based on the overcharge. Even if,
as the majority in Utilicorp
predicts, 165 a regulatory commission requires the utility to flow back to its customers the full amount of any damages they suffered, two-thirds of the treble
recovery from the overcharge would remain. A commission should allow the
utility to keep some or all of this amount 166
as compensation for incurring the
difficulties and inconveniences of litigation.
A further incentive should be considered. Utilities have an interest in protecting their markets. Many large industrial customers will have access to alternative sources of energy available and might switch if a utility's prices cease to
be competitive with available alternatives. This could result in a substantial and
possibly permanent loss in the utility's market share. A utility facing this potential competition would be unlikely to ignore an overcharge even if a one hundred
percent pass-through were available. As the respondents in Utilicorp noted,
"Customers who believe that the utility is looking out for their interests are
167
more likely to defer seeking permanent alternative sources of energy."
If states had been permitted to bring parenspatriae claims, they too would
have had a strong incentive to do so, at least when the anticompetitive behavior
affected large segments of the general public. Litigation would engender a high
degree of visibility and publicity for the attorneys general, who are, after all,
politicians. Not all commentators agree on the efficacy of such actions, however.
Professor (now Judge) Posner has expressed concern that the political character
of parenspatriae makes it an unreliable tool for antitrust enforcement:
There may well be a tendency under parenspatriaefor state attorneys
general to bring headline-grabbing, scapegoat-seeking suits against politically unpopular corporations, with little regard for the intrinsic antitrust merit of the suit and with little effort to press the suit to a
successful conclusion. By the time the case is ready for trial, the state
attorney general's office may be occupied by a new politician with little
165. See id. at 2814-15.

166. To illustrate, assume that U, a utility, sues its gas supplier S for antitrust violations. U
claims that S conspired illegally to raise the price of its fuel and that U thus incurred $800,000 in

excess costs because of the overcharge. For simplicity's sake, assume that U passed on this entire
amount to its customers. As a result, U's customers purchased less gas, costing U $200,000 in lost
profits. If U sues for the entire loss of $1 million ($800,000 in overcharges and $200,000 in lost
profits) and wins, trebling will result in a final award of $3 million, of which $2.4 million ($800,000
times 3) is allocable to the overcharge, and $600,000 ($200,000 times 3) is allocable to the utility's
lost profits. If regulators ordered all of the recovery traceable to the overcharge to be passed on, the
customers would receive a windfall of $2.4 million ($1.6 million more than their actual damages)
while the utility, which bore the risks and burdens of litigation, is left with only 20% of the award.

This outcome may deter utilities from bothering to bring antitrust claims in the future. Alternatively, if regulators mandated a flow-through of only $800,000 to the consumers, which is the actual
amount of damage they incurred, then the utilities would be left with a much more substantial
recovery of $2.2 million. Note that this amount includes two-thirds of the portion allocable to the
overcharge as well as all of the recovery allocable to lost sales. Regulators also could choose to split
the difference between these two examples in any manner they wished.
167. Brief for Respondent Utilicorp United, Inc. at 20, Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Ina, 110 S.
Ct. 2807 (1990) (No. 88-2109).
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168
interest in carrying out the projects of his predecessor.

Permitting parens patriae actions on behalf of indirect purchasers could
have an adverse impact on section four's deterrent effect. Injured parties not
represented by the states would, for the most part, fail to join the action because
their stake in the lawsuit would be nominal. This would reduce the aggregate
amount of the damage recovery, thus lowering the cost of illegal behavior to the
wrongdoers. Also, dividing the damage claims among plaintiffs at the outset
will reduce the portion of the damages the utility may seek, thereby reducing its
incentive to pursue the claim. As the number of potential plaintiffs grows, so
grows the possibility that the potential recovery to each individual plaintiff will
be insufficient to entice any of them into bringing an action.
Limiting standing to a regulated utility that has passed on most or all of the
overcharge to its customers is, all in all, an appropriate policy choice as it offers
the best chance of compensating the greatest number of victims while at the
same time providing adequate incentives for putative plaintiffs to pursue claims
vigorously. Allowing indirect purchasers to join the suit would lead to greater
complexity, multiplicity of parties, and higher costs, and would necessitate probing the intricacies of state regulatory law and the subtleties of sophisticated economic analysis in order to apportion damages among the various plaintiffs.
Applying the Illinois Brick standing limitation to a regulated direct purchaser
best advances the laws' compensatory and deterrence goals while providing a
prudent, if controversial, check against what might otherwise become unmanageably complex litigation.
LEE J. POTTER

168. Landes & Posner, Should Indirect PurchasersHave Standing,supra note 10, at 613.

